Democrats must decide whether they will allow a Northeast/West Coast faction to set the party's national agenda, or whether they will challenge the axis of liberal thought police to create a more inclusive game plan.

Over the past decades, the Democratic Party has experienced a steep and steady decline. In the mid-1970s, 50 percent of registered voters identified themselves as Democrats, while only 20 percent were registered Republicans. For almost 100 years, every elected official in the South had a "D" next to his name. The numbers have dramatically shifted. Today, 32 percent of Americans are registered Democrats, while Republicans are around 28 percent. Further, the once solid South is becoming solidly Republican. The death knell rung for Southern Democrats when Al Gore could not even win his native Tennessee during the 2000 election.

The puckish Howard Dean deems to have the answer, albeit one that was greeted coldly by his fellow contenders. The ever-witty Al Sharpton compared him to Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. Little did Sharpton know he was paying Dean a compliment: It takes the courage of a Stonewall Jackson to stand up and speak the truth. Bravo to Mr. Dean for courting Southern voters who, for a number of decades, have literally watched the Democratic Party abandon them.

These voters, characterized by Dean as pick-up truck driving, confederate flag waving, gun totting, poor white southerners, are an excellent target group for Democrats. They did not directly benefit from the tax cut and they are fiercely patriotic, but they question President Bush's Iraqi nation building. The problem is that Southerners do not trust Democrats on social issues. They see the national party as anti-gun and anti-religious. And it is these two cultural issues that prompted them to reject an authentic Southerner like Al Gore for a Yankee Connecticut transplant with an affected Texas accent, like George Bush. Howard Dean's point — that Dems need to court poor Southern voters — is 100 percent correct. (Although perhaps he should have used a less colorful image, like a NASCAR sticker instead of the confederate flag.) Democrats will lose unless they can pick off a few Southern states, and marginalizing poor white Southerners is the fastest way to last place.

But the best way to alienate this voting bloc? Take away their guns.

Just as demonizing abortion does not play well in California and the Northeast, so goes the gun issue in the rest of the country. For Americans who did not grow up in urban areas, it is a cultural reality deeply embedded in the fabric of family life. For people who grew up hunting, it is like taking away a baseball glove from a little leaguer. And by the way, it's not just Southerners who care about their firearms; Westerners care deeply about the debate as well.

When Dean said he wanted to bring in those Americans who the Democratic Party has abandoned, he was planning for the future. After all, no national election can be successful without appealing to the greatest number of voters. But this is not a point to make this early in the game, especially when one of the nation's strongest interest groups is the anti-gun lobby. Indeed, Dean may now have galvanized one of the most important factions of the Democratic Party against him at a critical moment — before the primary.

We've seen before how this tactic can backfire. When John McCain entered the 2000 Republican primary, he was a bona fide conservative with a voting record on abortion and guns that was staunchly to the right. However, in one swoop he moved from being a conservative to a moderate by attacking one of the grand poobahs of the Republican establishment: the leadership of the Christian right, Pat Robertson. McCain's strategy was accurate because the Christian right had indeed divided the county — no longer between the blue and the grey, but between the blue and the red. But his timing could not have been worse: If you are a candidate for your party's nomination, you generally don't tell the base to take a hike.

McCain's message, like Dean's today, was that the national party needed to move away from playing political cards that won in the more rural parts of the country, but failed miserably in the Northeast and West Coast. He wanted to restore the Republican Party to its winning Ronald Reagan strategy — a formula that allowed the Gipper to sweep traditionally Democratic strongholds (California, New York, and Massachusetts) because he didn't force one regional agenda over another.

McCain's presidential bid was an attempt to reverse the lines that were drawn in 1992 after Pat Buchanan's "cultural war" speech. This was the year when America was again divided into regions, and California, New York, and New England moved solidly into the Democratic camp, as Coastal Americans identified the national Republican Party as only a place for Christian conservatism. McCain understood that it was unhealthy for the national Republican Party to allow regional interest groups to set the national agenda. So, right before the South Carolina primary, he launched his assault to take back the Republican Party. Moderates were galvanized by McCain's courage and message. But moderates win general elections, not primaries.

George Bush's timing proved more successful. He used the Christian right to defeat McCain, but once he secured the nomination, he quickly kept the regional interest at bay. The Republican Convention in Philadelphia showcased a national party of every color and religious creed. Pro-choice governors were marched to the podium, and the only openly gay Republican member of Congress played a lead role in the proceedings.

Democratic activists complained that the Republicans engaged in theatrics, and the true believers in the religious right were annoyed, but Bush won the day. He remade himself: from Christian right candidate of South Carolina to a nationally acceptable compassionate conservative. While people who paid attention may not have been convinced, it was enough for the average voter to feel comfortable with voting for George W. Bush.

Dean, however, is great at sticking to a message, so while this recent flap may have thrown him off course for a few days, he seems to have found his bearings again — with a little help from labor. The SEIU (Service Employees International Union) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees endorsements may have saved him from a debacle in the primaries. But whomever the Democrats ultimately choose in Boston, they will have to win some love south of Mason-Dixon in order to win the big game.

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